Despite Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, pledging to end harassment by the notorious 'morality police' over violent hijab enforcement, the parliament has moved forward with passing a new restrictive law.
At his first press conference, responding to a female journalist's complaint about the morality police, Pezeshkian remarked, "They were not supposed to harm. We will follow up to ensure they don't bother you." During the election debates, he had an even more critical stance, referring to compulsory hijab enforcement as a “dark agenda.”
However, just two days after this statement, the Guardian Council approved the restrictive hijab law passed by the previous parliament in May 2023, imposing a range of restrictions and punishments on women’s clothing choices.
Later, the firebrand Friday prayer leader of Mashhad, Ahmad Alamolhoda, criticized Pezeshkian’s stance, saying, "The administration may not agree with a particular method of enforcement, but it has the authority to implement an alternative approach... however, rejecting the hijab is intolerable."
Reports indicate that the activity of the morality patrols has decreased since the start of the new administration, though this pattern has been seen in previous governments as well. The vice police patrols have historically been periodic and seasonal.
Meanwhile, many women in Tehran and other major cities have continued to defy the mandatory hijab since the 2022 protests following the death of Mahsa Amini in morality police custody. Since then, violent arrests have persisted, keeping the government on edge as it faces the constant threat of renewed public unrest.
The approval of the new hijab law, while the previous one remains unenforced, has drawn criticism from government-backed clerics. The challenge now is how to address these contradictions.
Three strategies for compulsory hijab enforcement
When analyzing the decisions of the Guardian Council, parliament, and officials' statements, alongside field observations, it appears the government has adopted a three-pronged strategy regarding the controversial hijab enforcement.
First, the strategy involves delaying the implementation of the new hijab law, even after its formal approval. This approval seems designed to appease Shia clerics, religious authorities, and Sharia-oriented officials within the ruling class. However, the law may remain unenforced, much like the longstanding ban on satellite TV equipment, which, after years of raids and confiscations, was largely ignored or forgotten. The public, accustomed to the inconsistent enforcement, is unlikely to protest the lack of rule of law, while religious loyalists will gradually shift focus and forget the issue.
The second strategy involves reverting to the previous method of enforcement—seasonal and periodic implementation of the new hijab law (such as the usual crackdowns every early summer) to maintain a constant level of intimidation. Simultaneously, the government may distance itself by unofficially suggesting that enforcement is not carried out by government or municipal employees, but by self-motivated individuals. This approach mimics the "volunteer" narrative seen with the Hijab Watch plan, where the Tehran municipality’s funding and involvement were quickly exposed despite claims of grassroots enforcement.
In this scenario, the law isn't entirely abandoned, keeping Sharia-oriented factions somewhat satisfied. Meanwhile, the president can claim, as others before him have, that "we don’t have enough power to stop it." This allows the Sharia believers to perceive Pezeshkian’s administration as sidelined on issues like internet filtering and hijab enforcement, despite its public stance.
The third strategy involves keeping the enforcement of the hijab law experimental rather than fully legal. Authorities may test the law in select provinces for a limited time, gauging societal reactions. If the law generates sufficient intimidation, it will be enforced; if not, it could be quietly abandoned, much like the satellite TV ban. If the majority comply and only a small group resists, the law would then be fully implemented.
This approach reflects a trial-and-error method, balancing power between the people and the government, and is aimed at preventing uprisings like the Mahsa Revolution. This perspective is reportedly supported by members of Khamenei's office and authoritarian factions. Notably, compulsory hijab wasn’t introduced by law—it was enforced in 1980, years before the hijab law was passed in 1985. Thus, the power struggle between the government and the people has always been the key factor.
Given society’s sensitivity and the sharp divide between authorities and the public—92% of whom are dissatisfied—this third strategy seems more likely. The regime understands that daily confrontations with ordinary citizens on the streets could threaten its survival.
Opinions expressed by the author are not necessarily the views of Iran International
